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Antimonopoly Law of JapanRelating to International Business
Transactions
Mitsuo Matsushita
and

James L. Hildebrand
HE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW of Japan' was enacted during
the Allied Occupation in an effort to prevent the reversion to
the prewar oligopolistic structure of Japanese industry in which
cartels (zaibatsu-holdingcompanies) regulated almost every major
field of activity.2 Originally
based on certain provisions of
the Sherman Act,8 the Clayton
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Tokyo. JAMES L. HILDEBRAND (A.B.,
Hamilton College; J.D., Case Western
Reserve University; S.J.D. candidate,
Harvard University) is a member of the

Commission Act,8 and on the
judicial interpretation of these
6
acts by American courts, the
Antimonopoly Law of Japan
categorically prohibited the use

Ohio Bar and an associate of a JapaneseAmerican law firm in Tokyo.

of cartels for the restriction of

production, the fixing of prices,
and the allocation of markets
and customers and also placed stringent restrictions on mergers,
stockholdings, and holding of multiple directorships and officerships.
1 Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monoply and the Maintenance of Fair
Trade of 1947, Law No. 54, translated in 2 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES, No. 2270,
KA-KI (F. Nakane ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Antimonopoly Law]. See also 3
OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1969).

2 For English language commentaries on the Antimonopoly Law of Japan, see
E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970); H.

IgoRI, ANTIMONOPOLY

LEGISLATION

IN JAPAN (1969); Kanazawa, The Regulation of Corporate Enterprise: The Law of
Unfair Competition and the Control of Monopoly Power, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 480 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963); Matsushita
& Lee, Antimonopoly Regulation of Marketing, in JAPAN'S MARKET AND FOREIGN
BUSINESS 159 (R. Ballon ed. 1971); TRADE BULLETIN CORPORATION, JAPAN'S
ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY IN LEGISLATION AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE (Tokyo

1968); Ariga & Reike, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39
WASH. L. REv. 437 (1964); Ashino, Experimenting with Antitrust Law in Japan, 3
JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L. 31 (1959); Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Act of Japan
and International Transactions, 14 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L. 1 (1970); Swada &
Brown, American-Japanese Antitrust Law, 2 INT'L L. BULLETIN 13 (No. 2 1963);
Yamamura, The Development of Antimonopoly Policy in Japan:The Erosion of Japanese
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The Antimonopoly Law has been amended numerous times,7 and
during the last 24 years the general trend has been to create exceptions to the Law. During the 1960's its enforcement was anemic.
However, there is growing evidence that the text of the statute and
the decisions implementing it in the past are being revitalized and
that the Antimonopoly Law is becoming one of the important legal
instruments to cope with various domestic as well as international
economic problems facing Japan today.8 It appears that the Antimonopoly Law may become one of a few remaining legal devices
of regulation to be stringently imposed by the Japanese Government
on international business transactions.'
The purpose of this article is to provide a general introduction
to the Antimonopoly Law of Japan, to describe its general structure
and the enforcement agencies related thereto, and to clarify certain
aspects of the Antimonopoly Law which are relevant to JapanUnited States business transactions, including the licensing of patAntimonopoly Policy, 1947-1967, 2 STUDIES IN LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1 (May 1967).
3 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U S. C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
4
Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
5
Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1919), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 41-51 (1970).
6See generally M. HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 84-185 (3d ed.
1960).
7 Law No. 91 of 1947; Law No. 195 of 1947; Law No. 207 of 1948; Law No. 268
of 1948; Law No. 103 of 1949; Law No. 134 of 1949; Law No. 214 of 1949; Law No.
192 of 1951; Law No. 211 of 1951; Cabinet Order No. 261 of 1951; Law No. 257 of
1952; Law No. 268 of 1952; Law No. 259 of 1953; Law No. 127 of 1954; Law No.
120 of 1956; Law No. 134 of 1956; Law No. 142 of 1957; Law No. 187 of 1957; Law
No. 129 of 1959; Law No. 111 of 1961; Law No. 134 of 1962; Law No. 140 of 1962;
Law No. 152 of 1962; Law No. 161 of 1962; Law No. 53 of 1963; Law No. 12 of
1964; Law No. 152 of 1964; Law No. 143 of 1965; Law No. 25 of 1966; Law No. 111
of 1966; Law No. 31 of 1967; Law No. 33 of 1969.
8 In the area of international business transactions, it can be foreseen that the Antimonopoly Law will play an increasingly important role especially due. to the fact that
other regulatory devices (e.g., currency and investment controls) are gradually being
relaxed in line with the Japanese Government's avowed progress in the area of liberalization of trade and investment. See Chase Manhattan Bank, Japan, 18 WORLD BUS,
33, 34 (special ed. 1970). Here it was observed that "[t]he slowly evolving policy of
liberalizing foreign direct investment in Japan has spurred mergers in those sectors into
which foreign capital will be allowed." Id. at 33. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 26,
1971, at 1, col. 5.
9 One commentator has observed that: "There are also indications that the Japanese
Anti-monopoly Law, which is based largely on the American antitrust laws and which
has not been applied particularly strenuously in the past, may be applied with increasing
vigor to increase its effectiveness as a device for controlling the activities of foreign investors in Japan." Calhun & Brumder, Japanese Laws Relating to Foreign Investment
in Japan, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1971, 24-25 (1971).
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ents and technology, the acquisition and control of Japanese business enterprises, and the utilization of distribution agreements.
I.

A.

THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW OF JAPAN

Major Regulations under the Law

Regulation under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law may be classified into the following three basic categories: (1) prohibition of
private monopolization, (2) prohibition of unreasonable restraints
of trade, and (3) prohibition of unfair business practices. Supplemental rules regulate other types of more specific activities, such as
mergers, acquisition and holding of stocks and assets, activities of
trade associations, false advertising, and others. However, the above
mentioned three types of regulation are the most basic ones.
The definition of "private monopolization" (shitekidokusen) is
given in Article 2(5) of the Law as "such business activities by
which any entrepreneur, individually or by combination, conspiracy,
or any other manner with other entrepreneurs, excludes or controls
the business activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in
any particular field of trade.""' Under this provision, monopolization by one entrepreneur is carried out either through the "exclusion" or the "control" of other entrepreneurs. "Exclusion" means
such activities by an entrepreneur as price discrimination, dumping,
imposition of harsh restrictions upon distributors and dealers (such
as unreasonable exclusive dealing arrangements and other restrictive
covenants, thereby eliminating competitors or other entrepreneurs
from certain markets. "Control of other enterprises" means such
activities as acquiring the business, the assets, or the shares of one
or more other entrepreneurs, thereby dominating the market and
eliminating competition." Such monopolization is prohibited by
Article 3 of the Law.
10 See note 1 supra. The prohibition of monopolization under this Article is roughly
equivalent to that set forth under Section 2 of the Sherman Act which provides that:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ."As delineated in the cases which have arisen under Section 2, it is "monopolization" and not "monopoly," which has been placed under the ban. See REPORT
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY

ANTrrRusT LAws 43-64 (1955).
11 These activities are also subject to regulation with regard to the acquisition of
stocks, mergers, etc., as discussed later in this article. See text accompanying notes
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"Unreasonable restraint of trade or cartel" (futona torihikiseigen) is defined in Article 2(6) of the Law as
such business activities by which any entrepreneur, by contract,
agreement, or any other form, in conjunction with other entrepeneurs, mutually restricts their business activities to fix, maintain, or
enhance prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities, another party to trade, etc., or executes such activities, thereby
causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of
competition in any particular field of trade.
Such unreasonable restraint of trade is prohibited by Article 3 of
the Law.
Prohibition of unreasonable restraint of trade is comparable to
the prohibition of conspiracies, combinations, and other restraints
of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 2 However, there
is an important difference between the Sherman Act and the Japanese Antimonopoly Law in that "unreasonable restraint of trade"
under the Japanese Law includes only horizontal agreements among
competitors which suppress competition among themselves (such as
price-fixing, territorial divisions, etc.) and does not encompass
agreements which establish vertical restraints on trade, such as the
imposition of resale price structures upon distributors and retailers
or the granting of exclusive sales territories to them. This interpretation is derived from the fact that Article 2(6) of the Law bans
only "mutual restriction" (sogo-kosoku) and therefore only those
agreements are restricted by which each participant is placed under
a similar obligation as the other participants.'" Boycotts are also
not included since such activity does not amount to the suppressing
of competition among participants; such activities are considered to
fall under the category of unfair business practices.
It should also be noted that certain types of cartels are exempted
from the application of the Antimonopoly Law by certain provisions
of the Law itself (such as depression cartels and rationalization
cartels) 14 and by the provisions of certain other laws (such as shipping conferences, airlines conventions, and others) .15
40-46 infra. These regulations are regarded as precautionary measures for preventing
private monopolization.
12 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1970).
Section 1 provides that: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations ..."is illegal.
13 Kabushiki Kaisha Asahi Shimbun Sha v. FTC, 6 KOSAI MINSHU (High Court
Civil Cases Reporter) 435 (1953).
14 Antimonopoly Law, arts. 24-3 & 24-4.
15 Article 22 of the Antimonopoly Law provides: "The provisions of this Law shall
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Article 2(7) of the Law defines "unfair business practices"
(fukoseina torihiki-hoho). These include such items as (1) unreasonable discrimination against other entrepreneurs, (2) charging unreasonably high or low prices, (3) unreasonably inducing or coercing customers or competitors to deal with oneself, (4) imposing
unreasonably restrictive conditions upon another party to a transaction, (5) abusing one's predominant bargaining power, and (6) unjust interference with a transaction between other entrepreneurs.
The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered and directed to
designate as unfair business practices specific acts coming under any
of the above categories and tending to impede fair competition. The
FTC has issued the so-called General Designation of Unfair Business Practices in which twelve kinds of activities have been designated.1" This General Designation applies to all industries. In
not apply to such legitimate acts of an entrepreneur or a trade association conducted
under the provisions of a special law or an order to be issued thereunder in the event
that such special law has been established for the special enterprise."
16
Fair Trade Commission Notification No. II (1953).
In accordance with
with the provisions of Article 2 (7) of the Law Concerning Prohibition of
Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Law No. 54 of 1947),
unfair business practices, other than specific business practices in a particular
field of trade to be designated in accordance with the procedure as provided
for in Article 71 of said Law, shall be designated as follows:
Unfair Business Practices
(1) Unduly refusing or limiting deliveries from certain entrepreneurs or
to supply to certain other entrepreneurs, commodities, funds, or other kinds
of economic benefit.
(2) Affording, without good reason, substantially favorable or unfavorable
treatment to certain entrepreneurs in regard to the terms or execution of transactions.
(3) Excluding certain entrepreneurs from concerted activities or from a
trade association, or unduly discriminating against specific entrepreneurs in
the concerted activities of the trade association, thereby causing to such entrepreneurs undue disadvantage with respect to their business activities.
(4) Supplying or receiving without good cause, commodities, funds, or
other kinds of economic benefit at prices which discriminate between customers in different places or between customers.
(5) Supplying commodities, funds, or other kinds of economic benefit at
unreasonably low prices or receiving them at unreasonably high prices.
(6) Inducing or coercing, directly or indirectly, customers of a competitor to deal with oneself by offering undue advantages or threatening undue disadvantages in the light of normal business practices.
(7) Dealing with customers on the condition that they shall, without good
cause, not supply commodities, funds, or other kinds of economic benefit from
a competitor of oneself.
(8) Dealing with customers on conditions which, without good reason,
restrict any transaction between the said customers and the supplier of commodities, funds, or other kinds of economic benefit to them or between the
said customers and any person receiving those from them, or any relationship
between the said customer and their competitors.
(9) Dealing with a company on the condition, without good reason, that
the appointment of officers of that company, meaning those as defined by
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addition the FTC has made certain specific designations in which
certain kinds of activities in particular industries are denominated
as unfair business practices (such as certain activities within the
shipping industry). "Unfair business practices" are prohibited by
Article 19 of the Law.
B.

The Enforcement Agencies and the Forms of Actions

(1) The Enforcement Agencies-The Antimonopoly Law is
enforced by the FTC and the courts. The FTC is an independent
administrative and quasi-judicial regulatory commission composed
of a chairman and four other commissioners appointed by the Prime
Minister with the consent of the Diet, in much the same way that
the members of the Federal Trade Commission are appointed in the
United States.17 Indeed, the Japanese FTC is modeled after the
American Federal Trade Commission. However, unlike the American practice where the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission both retain certain powers in their respective fields, the
power to initiate action under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law is
concentrated in the hands of their FTC with the exception of damage claims brought by private individuals. In Japan the FTC is the
only agency conferred with the power to bring administrative action
against Antimonopoly Law violators.
(2) Forms of Actions under the Law-The FTC may initiate
administrative action against persons or companies violating the
Antimonopoly Law. If an activity is believed to be in violation of
the Law, the FTC investigates the case and, if the result of such investigation indicates that a violation has occurred and the FTC determines that initiating action will serve the public interest, then it
subsection (3) or Article 2 of the Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private
Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, shall be subject to prior direction
or approval by oneself.
(10) Trading with customers on conditions which are unduly unfavorable in the light of normal business practices by making use of one's predominant position over the said customers.
(11) Unjustly interfering with a transaction between other entrepreneurs
who compete in Japan with oneself or with the company of which oneself is
a stockholder or an officer and their party to such transaction by preventing
the execution of a contract, or by inducing breach of contract, or by any other
means whatsoever.
(12) Unjustly inducing, abetting, or coercing a stockholder or an officer
of a company which competes in Japan with oneself or a company of which
oneself is a stockholder or an officer, to act against the interest of such company by the exercise of voting rights, transfer of stock, divulgence of secrets,
or any other means whatsoever.
17
See 15 U. S. C. § 41 (1970).
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opens an administrative proceeding against the violator pursuant to
Article 49 of the Law. In this administrative trial, the investigator
makes a formal charge and the respondent is given an opportunity
to defend himself in much the same way that he would in the courts.
After this administrative trial, a decision is handed down by the
FTC.
There are three types of decisions under the Law. The first one
is a regular decision which is handed down after an administrative
trial. The second is a recommendation decision which is issued
pursuant to Article 48 of the Law. In the case of a recommendation decision, the FTC recommends that a violator cease and desist
from specific activities which the FTC deems to be in violation of the
provisions of the Law. The decision is handed down without an
administrative trial if the violator accepts the recommendation. A
majority of the cases are resolved by this procedure. Where the
violator rejects the recommendation, the usual procedure is the initiation of an administrative trial. The third type of decision is a
consent decision which is issued pursuant to Article 53-3 of the
Law. If, after the administrative trial has been initiated, the respondent proposes to the FTC that he will take some measures to
eliminate the violation and the FTC accepts such 'proposal, the administrative trial is stopped at that point and a consent decision is
made.
There is no difference with regard to the legal effect between
the above described kinds of decisions. If a person does not observe
the terms of the decision, under Articles 90, 95 and 97, he may be
punished by a fine or penal servitude.
An appeal can be taken from the decision of the FTC to the
Tokyo High Court and then to the Supreme Court except in the
cases of recommendation decisions and consent decisions. In these
latter cases, an appeal is barred by the rule of estoppel. With regard to those legal cases resulting from the decisions of the FTC,
the Tokyo High Court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article
85 of the Law.
Whenever damage to property was caused by a violation of the
Antimonopoly Law, the persons who sustained such damage may
institute a claim for recovery in the Tokyo High Court. Under
Article 25 of the Law, a violation of the Antimonopoly Law is regarded as a tort and therefore a tort claim is permitted. However,
in order to bring a tort claim under Article 25, a decision must have
been issued by the FTC (it does not matter what kind of decision)
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with regard to the case in question. In other words, the injured
party must wait until the decision of the FTC has become final and
conclusive before instituting a tort action.' 8 When a decision has
been rendered by the FTC with regard to a particular case, this decision may serve as conclusive evidence of illegality in a subsequent
tort claim action against the respondent. Tort claims on the basis
of antimonopoly violations have not been very common in Japan in
the past. However, there is an apparent trend toward an increase
of such actions.
Private monopolization and unreasonable restraint of trade are
criminal offenses and are punished by a fine or imprisonment or
both, pursuant to Article 89 of the Law. In criminal proceedings
in which the Tokyo High Court has exclusive jurisdiction, the FTC
has the exclusive power to accuse the violator before the ProcuratorGeneral and under Article 96, the Procurator-General may initiate
a criminal action only after such accusation has been made. Such
criminal actions have rarely been brought in Japan.
C.

jurisdiction of the Antimonopoly Law with Regard to
InternationalTransactions

(1) The General Principle-There is no definition in the Japanese Antimonopoly Law with regard to jurisdiction over international transactions. However, it would seem that the jurisdiction of
the Antimonopoly Law is based on the principle of territorial jurisdiction even though it is not easy to establish concrete jurisdictional
tests. It could be argued that the Law applies only to business activities carried out either in whole or in part within the territory of
Japan. The principle of territorial jurisdiction is derived from the
following factors: (1) Generally speaking, Japanese domestic laws
which are designed to be applied to activities conducted outside the
territory of Japan have provisions explicitly stating that they shall
have an extraterritorial effect. 9 There is no such provision in the
18 However, the injured party may institute a tort claim against the violator under
Article 709 of the Civil Code of 1896, Law No. 89, as amended, which permits recovery
for damages caused by tortious acts. In such a case, however, the litigation is more difficult since the plaintiff must prove the illegality of the conduct of the defendant.
19 For example, Section 2 of the Criminal Code of 1907, Law No. 45, as amended,
applies to any person who has committed certain enumerated crimes (such as counterfeiting currency, etc.) "outside of Japan." Similarly, Section 36 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949, Law No. 228, as amended, states that
a resident of Japan cannot acquire any real estate or any right thereto "in a foreign
country," unless expressly permitted by the Minister of Finance. Section 37 of this
Law also prohibits disposing of any real estate or any right thereto in a foreign country
by a resident of Japan.
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Antimonopoly Law and it may be inferred from the absence of such
a provision that the Law is not intended to have extraterritorial effect. (2) Under its Constitution, Japan is obligated to respect and
observe general principles of international law,2" and the rule of
international law with regard to jurisdiction of national (domestic)
law is that such law is basically territorial in effect.2 From the
principle of territorial jurisdiction, it follows that the regulation of
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law can be applied only when an activity constituting a violation, or at least a portion of it, is carried out
in Japan. Perhaps Article 6 of the Law, which is explained below,
is the exception to this general interpretation of territorial jurisdic2
tion and represents a shift toward an objective territorial approach.
(2) Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law-Article 6 of the Law,
which is specifically designed for the regulation of international
agreements and contracts, provides: "No entrepreneur shall enter
into an international agreement or an international contract which
contains therein such matters as coming under the purview of unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair business practices."
So far as the prohibitions concerning unfair business practices
are concerned, Article 6(1) of the Law covers a wider area than
does Article 19 which is the general provision for the prohibition
of unfair business practices and which provides categorically that
"no entrepreneur shall engage in unfair business practices." Article
6(1) prohibits the "entering into" of an international contract
which includes elements constituting unfair business practices.
Therefore, practically speaking this prohibition applies not only to
the malefactor, that is, the one who may actually commit the unfair
business practice, but also to the victim of such practice as long as
2

o JAPAN CoNsT. art. 98 (2)

(1946).

21 For example, Belgium's Trade Regulation Law of May 27, 1960, only applies to

the exercise of conduct "within the territory of the kingdom." It is also well established
that "the penal laws of a country have no extraterritorial force." 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1960).
See also American Banana Co. v. United States,
213 U.S. 347 (1909), where the court stated that all United Sates legislation is prima
facie territorial. Id. at 357.
22
The Court in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), explained this
principle as follows: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the
actor] had been present at the time of the detrimental effect, if the state should succeed in
getting him within its powers." This view has been followed in subsequent American
antitrust cases. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 18 (2d ed. 1965); Blakeny, Legal Aspects of Private Investments
in Japan, in 3 INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD 289 (1961).
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he is a party to the international contract containing provisions
deemed to constitute unfair business practices.
There are some types of unfair business practices in which the
malefactor and the victim are the parties to a contract constituting
unreasonable practices, such as exclusive dealing contracts, tie-in
agreements, or contracts between a powerful enterprise and a subcontractor by which the former imposes unreasonable conditions
upon the latter or misuses its dominant bargaining power. Even if
such malefactor is a foreign enterprise and stays outside the territorial jurisdiction of Japan, Article 6 can be applied to the transaction if the other party to the contract resides in Japan. Article 6
applies to the Japanese parties in most cases since the prohibition
extends to "entering into" an international contract containing such
provisions so as to constitute unfair business practices. The domestic enterprise which directly suffers from unreasonable restrictions
in an international contract with such provisions is usually a party
to the agreement. This is a rather unusual way of applying the
Antimonopoly Law since theoretically it catches the injured party
instead of the injuring party and holds the former as a violator.
However, this provision of the Law can be utilized to eliminate unreasonable restrictions imposed on domestic enterprises by international contracts when the foreign parties imposing such restrictions
are outside the territorial jurisdiction of Japan. In this way the
Japanese Government can use the Antimonopoly Law to protect
domestic enterprises. Furthermore, it would seem that this provision effectively extends the regulation of the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law to foreign enterprises residing outside the territorial jurisdiction of Japan who enter into contracts with domestic parties, since
the Law can be interpreted as prohibiting domestic parties from
entering into any contract containing provisions which constitute
unfair business practices. 23
The present wording of Article 6 was incorporated into the
Antimonopoly Law in a 1953 amendment. 24 There had been no
decision under amended Article 6 until the recent case of FTC v.
Amano Seiyaku Kabushiki Kaisha,25 which is discussed below. Most
probably the reason for the dearth of case law is that international
contracts involving foreign investment in Japan - especially the
23
24

See Matsushita, supra note 2, at 9-10.
Law No. 259 (1953).

25 16 KOSEI TORIHIKI IINKAI SHINKETSU

(1970).

SHU (FTC Decisions Reporter)

138
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licensing of patents and technology - have, until recently, been examined by the Foreign Investment Council of the Japanese Government under the Foreign Investment Law. 6 Prior to the notification
to the FTC, when some objectionable restrictions were involved,
elimination or revision usually occurred at that preliminary stage.
However, the avowed goal of the Japanese Government is increased
liberalization of capital transactions, and therefore the trend today
appears to be toward a relaxation of governmental controls which
were previously exercised under the Foreign Investment Act. Under
these circumstances, it is foreseeable that Article 6 may be applied
more and more to regulate the contents of international contracts.
(3) Notification-Under Article 6, an entrepreneur who has
entered into an international contract must report that contract to
the FTC. In this regard, Article 6(2) provides: "In the event that
an international agreement or an international contract is concluded,
every entrepreneur shall file a report of said effect, together with a
copy of the said agreement or contract (in the case of a verbal agreement or contract, a statement demonstrating the contents thereof),
with the Fair Trade Commission within thirty days as from the day
of its conclusion pursuant to the provisions of its Regulation."
Pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Law, this reporting duty does
not apply to an agreement or contract with respect to a single transaction (except in the case of transactions such as those in which the
delivery of goods extends over a period of one year), or to an agreement or contract merely creating an agency in business matters (with
the exception of agreements or contracts containing conditions that
restrict the business activities of the other party or parties).
As is shown in Table 1 (printed at the end of this article), during the first half of 1971 a total of 1,542 international contracts
were reported to the FTC, which represents a 78.3 percent increase
over the comparable period of the previous year. During the last
five years the total number of contracts reported to the FTC each
year has been as follows: for 1966 a total of 663 cases, for 1967 a
total of 917 cases, for 1968 a total of 1,868 cases, for 1969 a total
of 1,648 cases, and for 1970 a total of 1,739 cases. A marked increase in reported cases is apparent. Of the 1,542 cases reported during the first half of 1971, 48.2 percent or 741 cases involved United

26

Law Concerning Foreign Investment of 1950, Law No. 163, as amended.
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States companies and 140 cases involved British and West German
companies. Although the number of cases involving investments in
developing countries is small, companies in almost all countries of
the world were parties to one contract or another during the first
half of 1971.
The present system is a post notification system, that is, notification is given after entering into the contract or agreement. However, the view has been expressed that this post notification system
should be changed to a prior notification system in order to avoid
the legal insecurity which results from the possibility that an international contract or agreement, after having been entered into, may
be held in violation of the Antimonopoly Law when it is later reported to the FTC.
(4) Application of Article 6-In FTC v. Amano Seiyaku
Kabushiki Kaisha,28 Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law, as amended,
was applied for the first time to restrictive clauses in an international agreement. The facts of the case are as follows: Amano Seiyaku
Kabushiki Kaisha (hereinafter referred to as "Amano") was a Japanese enterprise engaged in the production and sale of pharmaceutical products including enzymes. In June 1966, Amano entered into
an international contract with a Danish company, Novo Industri
A/S (hereinafter referred to as "Novo"), in which it was agreed
that Novo would give the right to Amano to distribute its product
"Alcalaise," an alkaline bacterial proteinase (an ingredient of a
cleaning agent), in certain areas. Specifically, Amano was given an
exclusive distributorship of this product in Japan and Okinawa, and
a nonexclusive distributorship in Korea and Taiwan. In this distribution agreement, the following restrictions were included: (1)
Amano could not manufacture and sell competing products for
three years after the termination of the contracts; (2) Amano could
not sell competing products manufactured by some other enterprise
in Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, or Korea (no definite period being
stipulated for the duration of this restriction); and (3) Amano
should maintain a certain minimum resale price when it sold the
products imported from Novo. In this contract, the applicable law
was stipulated to be Danish law, and the Danish Commercial and
27 Yazawa, Gijutsu Donyu no Jiyuka ni Kansuru Hoteki Taisaku (Legal Measures
Relating to Liberalization of Introduction of Foreign Technology), 450 SHOJI HOMU
KHNKYU (Commercial Law Bulletin) 2 (1968).
28 16 KOSEI TORIHIKI JINKAI SHINKETSU SHU (FTC Decisions Reporter) 138
(1970).
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Maritime Court was appointed as the court of first instance. This
contract was notified to the FTC in 1969, and it was terminated
at the end of the same year. However, the first two restrictive
clauses were deemed to survive the termination of the agreement.
The FTC, considering that the restrictions contained in this contract violated Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law, issued a recommendation to Amano on December 16, 1969. The recommendation
stated that the restrictive clause in the contract prohibiting Amano
from handling products in competition with Novo's products was
an unreasonable restrictive dealing clause tantamount to Item No. 7
as set forth in the FTC's General Designation of Unfair Business
Practices,2 9 that the restrictive clause prohibiting Amano to produce,
sell, or handle competing products was an unreasonable restriction
imposed on Amano tantamount to Item No. 8 of the said General
Designation, and that the clause fixing minimum resale prices also
was an unreasonable restriction imposed on Amano tantamount to
Item No. 8 of the General Designation. The FTC requested Amano
to eliminate these clauses, and Amano accepted this request. Accordingly, the FTC issued a recommendation decision on January
12, 1970 which ordered Amano to cancel these restrictions. However, as regards the clause fixing minimum resale price maintenance,
the FTC took no action since the issue had now become moot due
to the fact that the resale price maintenance clause had been terminated together with the entire agreement.
As noted before, the Amano case was the first case in which
amended Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law was applied to restrictive clauses contained in an international agreement. In this
case, Amano "entered into" an international contract containing restrictive provisions which constituted unfair business practices.
Amano was deemed to be a violator of Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law even though, in substance, it was the injured party.
Novo, the injuring party, was not named as a respondent since it
had no business establishment in Japan.
After the decision of the FTC was handed down to Amano,
Novo initiated an action against the FTC 0 in the Tokyo High Court
29
30

See note 16 supra.

Novo Industri A/S v. FTC, Tokyo Kosai, Showa 45 Nen (Gyo Ke) Dai 16 Go,
Shinketsu Torikeshi Seikyu Jiken (Tokyo High Court, Administrative Case No. 16,
1970) (Case Concerning Cancellation of FTC Decision). For a discussion of this case,
complete text appended thereto, see Matsushita, Novoshajiken Kosaihanketsu To Somokousaitorihikikankyoeno Eaikyo (The Tokyo High Court Decision and Its Impact
on International Transactions), 564 SHoJI HOMU KENKYU (Commercial Law Bulletin)
21 (1971).
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alleging that, due to the FTC's recommendation decision, it had
been deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard and that this was
contrary to the principle of due process of law as stipulated in the
Constitution." In seeking to obtain a judgment declaring the FTC
decision illegal and void, Novo alleged that the adverse effect of
the FTC decision was felt by it most strongly since the distribution
policy of Novo in selling the product in Japan would be seriously
hampered by the elimination of the restrictive clauses incorporated
into the initial agreement with Amano. Thus Novo argued that it
should be allowed to sue in the court even though the FTC order
had not been addressed to it.
On May 19, 1971, the Tokyo High Court handed down its decision denying Novo the right to an action before the Court on the
grounds that the right to sue against the FTC for the cancellation of
its order was limited to the party whose legal interest had been injured by the order and that Novo's legal interest had not been injured by said order. The reasoning of the Court was based on the
following three points: (1) The order of the FTC was not directed
to Novo and, therefore, Novo was under no obligation to obey it;
(2) The order of the FTC was an administrative order directing the
respondent to eliminate the illegal provisions of the contract to
which the respondent was a party, and therefore the order did not
necessarily invalidate the private law effect of said contract;3 ' and
(3) The disadvantage that Novo might incur from the FTC order
was considered to be de facto and not a legal disadvantage. This
case has been appealed to the Supreme Court and is still pending
as of the first of June, 1972.
II.
A.

SOME PROBLEM AREAS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS

Licensing of Patents and Technology

(1) General Principles-As in most countries, patentable inventions are protected in Japan. 3 A monopoly position enjoyed by
the patentee or its exclusive licensee in the particular field covered
by the patent is not by itself subject to attack under the Antimonopoly Law. Article 23 of the Law provides for the exemption
art. 32 (1946).
32 For a brief discussion concerning the private law effect in Japan of a transaction
31 JAPAN CoNsT.

that violates public law, see Akarnatsu, Legal Practices, in DOING BUsINESS
144-47 (R. Ballon ed. 1968).
33 Section 29 of the Patent Law of 1959, Law No. 121, as amended.

IN JAPAN
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of those activities which amount to the valid exercise of patent and
other industrial property rights. This Article states: "The provisions of this Law shall not apply to such acts as recognized to be
within the execution of rights under the Copyright Law, the Patent
Law, Utility Model Law, the Design Law, and the Trademark Law."
Generally speaking, the licensing of patents and utility models
is exempted from the application of the Antimonopoly Law. Restrictive clauses, such as territorial or customer restrictions, fixing
of prices of patented products, period of exercise of the patented
products, or exclusive dealing arrangements involved in licensing
contracts, are not illegal under the Antimonopoly Law as long as
they are regarded as being within the scope of the patent monopoly.
However, restrictions extending beyond the scope of the Patent Law
do fall within the restrictions of the Antimonopoly Law, and it is
often difficult to draw a clear line between those restrictions which
are within the scope of patent rights and those which are not. Since
most problems which arise concerning the relationship between
patents and the Antimonopoly Law are concerned with restrictions
in licensing agreements, the discussion which follows will be limited
to the problems relating to restrictions incorporated in patent and
technology licensing agreements.
It may be helpful at this point to set forth a hypothetical case.
Assume an American company A, a British company B and a Japanese company C agree to establish a jointly-owned Japanese company D. The licensing agreement is executed between A, B and C
on the one hand and D on the other. A, B and C grant to D the
exclusive right to manufacture and sell the product X under the
patents owned by them. In this licensing agreement, the following
restrictive conditions are incorporated: (1) D is obligated to purchase certain materials needed for the production of product X from
company E, another company which is jointly-owned by A, B and
C; (2) D is obligated not to export the patented products outside
Japan, and especially not to the United States and England; (3) D
is obligated to maintain the sales price of product X in Japan; and
(4) D is obligated to refrain from selling the patented product in
the area south of Osaka, Japan, in which another company, company F, which is jointly-owned by A, B and C, will sell the product
X. What are the antimonopoly aspects of this case?
The clause obligating D to purchase the necessary materials
(which we assume are unpatented) from E only would seem to be
hardly justifiable under the Antimonopoly Law. Also the clause
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restricting the sales area of D to Japan is difficult to justify. The
clause which fixes the sales price is perhaps justifiable; however, the
fixing of resale price is clearly not permissible except for the cases
in which the commodities concerned are those fulfilling the requirements for the exemption of the Antimonopoly Law under Article
24-2."4 The clause limiting the business territory of D in Japan
to the area north of Osaka is perhaps lawful. Viewed in this way,
some of the restrictive clauses appear to be legal, some illegal, and
some in the grey area between. What then, are the general principles, if any, regulating these relationships?
As to these problems, the legal rules have not yet been fully
developed in Japan. However, it is possible to make some general
remarks. As noted before, restrictive clauses incorporated in licensing agreements may escape the application of the Antimonopoly
Law as long as they are regarded as valid exercises of the rights established under the Patent Law. 5 Any restriction in an international licensing agreement that goes beyond the legitimate scope
granted by the Patent Law is liable to attack under the Antimonopoly Law as either an unreasonable restraint of trade or an unfair business practice, depending on the nature of the restriction involved.
However, among these, the unfair business practice aspect is the most
important for practical purposes, since antimonopoly problems regarding patent licensing arise mostly concerning the imposition of
restrictions upon the subsidiaries and licensees by parent companies
34 Article 24-2 ( 1) of the Antimonopoly Law states:

The provisions of this Law shall not apply to justifiable acts to be undertaken
by an entrepreneur, who produces or sells a commodity which is designated by
the Fair Trade Commission and the identical quality of which can be easily
recognized, for the purpose of fixing and maintaining with the entrepreneur
of the other party selling the said commodity the resale price thereof (Such
shall mean the price of the commodity to be sold by the entrepreneur of the
other party, or to be sold by an entrepreneur who purchased it from the entrepreneur of the other party offering to sell; hereinafter the same.); Provided,
further, That nothing herein contained shall be lawful in the event that the
said act may be unduly to injure the interest of the general consumer, or may
be contrary to the will of the entrepreneur producing the commodity in the
case of the entrepreneur offering to sell.
It is interesting to note that most of the Japanese commentaries on this problem rely
heavily on the cases and legal commentary concerning patents and the Sherman Act in
the United States.
35
Article 77(1) & (2) of the Patent Law of 1959, Law No. 121, as amended,
states: "(1) Any patentee may establish an exclusive license in respect of his patent
right. (2) Any exclusive licensee shall have the exclusive right to undertake as his
business the working of such patented invention within the limit as prescribed by the
act of creation." Translated in 6 EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIEs No. 6850, SA-A (F.
Nakane ed. 1960).
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and licensors. Such unilateral imposition of restrictions has been
held to fall within the category of unfair business practices.
The FTC has published guidelines with regard to the enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law against various types of restrictions
involved in international licensing agreements. The rules given in
these guidelines may provide some useful information as to what
kinds of restrictive covenants in international licensing agreements
are allowed and which are viewed with disfavor by the FTC.
(2)
Antimonopoly Law Guidelines-The "Antimonopoly Law
Guidelines for International Licensing Agreements" were issued by
the FTC on May 24, 1968,6 immediately prior to the second round
of liberalization. In a preface to the Guidelines, the FTC briefly
summarized the background which led to such publication and the
reasons thereof as follows. The Antimonopoly Law provides for
post notification of international agreements and measures for elimination of illegal agreements. However, there have been very few
instances in which such agreements were filed with the FTC and
once filed were held violative of the Law. The reason for this
dearth of violations under Article 6 of the Law is due to the fact
that unreasonable restrictions contained in international licensing
agreements had so far been modified or removed in the process of
screening under the Foreign Investment Act. However, as the
liberalization of capital transactions progressed, it was intended that
the advance screening process would no longer be undertaken.
Therefore, such restrictions would come increasingly under the post
scrutiny pursuant to amended Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law.
The FTC decided to issue the Guidelines to afford the opportunity
for the contracting parties of international licensing agreements to
take the attitude of the FTC into consideration in advance and thereby, hopefully, to avoid illegal restrictive clauses from being included
in such licensing agreements.
Item I of the Guidelines enumerates the restrictions found in international licensing agreements concerning patent rights or utility
model rights which are most liable to fall within the general category of unfair business practices. However, since this Item enumerates only certain outstanding restrictions, any other restrictions not
enumerated should not be considered as necessarily falling outside
36 The entire text of the Guidelines is set forth in Appendix A at the end of this
For a discussion of these Guidelines, see GIJUTSUDONYU KEIYAKu NiTEIKIJUN NO KAISBTSU (Commentary on Antimonopoly Law Guidelines for International

article.

Licensing Agreements) (1968), which was edited by the Section Chief of the International Section of the FTC.
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the scope of the Antimonopoly Law. Item II of the Guidelines indicates that restrictions in international know-how licensing agreements will be treated in the same manner as those in international
licensing agreements concerning patent rights or utility model rights.
Item III of the Guidelines enumerates certain restrictive practices
which will be regarded as the valid exercise of patent rights.
Item I of the Guidelines lists nine types of restrictions as falling
under the ban. They are (1) the prohibition or limitation of export
areas of the products covered by a licensed patent, (2) the fixing
of the licensee's export prices or export quantities and the limitation
of licensee's channels of export distribution, (3) the prohibition or
limitation of handling competing products (technology), (4) the
tie-in clause whereby the licensee is obligated to purchase certain
materials from a fixed supplier, (5) the compulsory selling of goods
through the licensor or his designee, (6) the fixing of resale prices
in Japan, (7) the grant-back clause whereby the licensee is obligated
to grant back improvement patents and other technology to the
licensor, (8) the collection of royalties on unpatented products, and
(9) the restrictions imposed on quality of raw materials or parts,
etc. Any such restrictions, if found in an international licensing
agreement, will make the Japanese licensee vulnerable to a violation
of Article 19 of the Antimonopoly Law. In the cases of (1), (2),
(3), (7) and (9), some saving clauses are attached exonerating the
enumerated restrictive clauses in certain situations. In the other
cases, no such saving statements are attached, and, therefore, it
seems that the types of restrictions enumerated in (4), (5), (6),
(8) are not justifiable under any circumstance.
Limitation of sales territory and fixing of prices of the patented
products imposed by a foreign licensor on a Japanese licensee is
usually considered to be within the scope of the patent monopoly
when such restrictions relate to the Japanese domestic market. However, the prohibition of export or the fixing of export prices and
other restrictions related to exports are generally considered to be
outside the patent monopoly since the Japanese Patent Law covers
only the territory of Japan. Since a large portion of all Japanese
manufacturing is in someway involved with foreign technology, it is
not surprising that the Japanese Government takes an increasingly
37
hard line on export territory restrictions.
37 One commentator has noted: "There is of course no way of knowing how limiting
the technological agreements involved may be on Japan's export capability, but it is
reasonable to assume that it is a substantial and growing handicap as Japan's exports
swing toward more sophisticated products. It may be concluded therefore, that recourse
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With regard to restrictions such as tie-in clauses, limitation of
channels of distribution, fixing of resale prices, and collecting royalties on unpatented products, it should be observed that these types
of restrictions have nothing to do with the exercise of licensed patents and, therefore, they may be regarded as "naked restrictions."
Probably this is the reason why they are prohibited without any
further qualification. On the other hand, the restrictions such as
the prohibition or the limitation of handling competing products
imposed upon a licensee, even though strictly speaking not within
the scope of the patent monopoly, may be ancillary to the main
transaction - that is, the licensing of the patents or technology to
the Japanese company. Therefore, such restrictions are not subject
to per se prohibition. Restrictions imposed on the quality of raw
materials or parts may be regarded as the exercise of the patent
monopoly in certain situations. For example, it may be necessary
to impose such restrictions in order to maintain the efficiency of the
technology licensed. For this reason, this type of restriction is also
not treated as illegal per se.
When some of the restrictions involved in an international patent or technology licensing agreement are found to be illegal by the
FTC, it then issues a cease-and-desist order to the respondent stating
that such restrictions must be eliminated from the license agreements to which the respondent is a party. It should be emphasized
here that both the licensor who imposes such restrictions, and the
licensee, upon whom such restrictions are imposed, may be held to
have violated Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law which prohibits
a domestic party from entering into an international agreement
whose content constitutes an unfair business practice. In actuality
most of the objectionable restrictions are stricken out of the agreements pursuant to the "administrative guidance" (Gyosei shido) of
the FTC before formal proceedings are initiated.
(3) Status of Administrative Guidance-International contracts reported to the FTC are screened on the basis of the standards
discussed above. As a result of the screening of the 1,542 cases
reported during the first half of 1971, 51 cases (62 cases for the
comparative period of the previous year) as shown in Table 2
(printed at the end of this article) were subjected to informal "administrative guidance" of the FTC because of possible Antimonopoly
to secret and extra-legal agreements restraining sales territories will be increasingly hazardous and subject to cancellation through FTC intervention," J. ABEGGLEN, BUsINESS
STRATEGIES FOR JAPAN 127 (1970).
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Law violations. Ordinarily the number of cases for which guidance
is required increases in proportion to an increase in the number of
cases reported. However, as is obvious from the following figures,
the number of such cases for the first half of 1971 is half that of the
comparative period of the previous year:
Number of cases
reported

Number of cases
guided

Percentage of
occurrence

First half of 1970

865

62

7.2%

Second half of 1970

774

38

4.9%

1,542

51

3.3%

First half of 1971

This trend may indicate the effectiveness of the FTC's Guidelines.
Of the 51 cases which required guidance during the first half of
1971, a United States company was party to the contractin 22 cases
(43.1 percent), West Germany in nine cases (17.6 percent) and
England and Sweden in 5 cases (9.8 percent).
(4) Recent Cases-There have been few FTC or court decisions regarding illegal restrictions in international patent or technology licensing agreements. However, there have been several recent exemplary instances in which the FTC, through the process of
informal "administrative guidance," has advised the enterprises concerned to modify the contents of their particular licensing agreements in order to avoid the danger of an antitrust attack. 8
One such case involved a contract between a Japanese enterprise
and a Swiss enterprise in which it was agreed that the Swiss enterprise (the licensor of the patent) would have the right to file for
the patent rights to the improvements of the technology made by
the Japanese enterprise (licensee) in any country that the Swiss
company desired. However, as the result of the advice of the FTC,
the contract was amended to the effect that the Japanese company
would have the primary right of filing for the patent rights for such
technological improvements and that only when the Japanese com38

The first four cases which follow have been reported by the International Section
of the FTC in 101 KAIGAI SHOJI HOMU KENKYu (International Business Law Bulletin) Nov. 1970, at 36. The fifth case has been reported in Nomoto, Kokusai Keiyaku
Shinsu Gyomu no Jitsujo (Present Status of Screening Activities in Connection with
International Contracts), Zaisei Keizai Koho (Information on Finance and Economy)
Dec. 6-13, 1971, at 4. All five of these "cases" were resolved pursuant to informal
administrative guidance from the FTC and therefore no formal administrative proceding
occurred. For other examples see Iyori, Showayonjugonenbochuno Kokusai Keiya Kuno
Shimsajo Kyo (International contracts filed and examined by the FTC between April
1969 and March 1970), 97 KAIGAI SHOJI HOMU (International Business Law Bulletin)
4 (1970).
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pany did not wish to file such claims, would the Swiss company have
the right to file for the patent rights.
In a second case, which involved a joint venture between a Japanese company A and an American company B, the original draft of
the licensing contract stipulated that A would be prohibited from
manufacturing or handling the products in competition with the
products of the Japanese joint venture subsidiary company as long
as either A or B was a stockholder of this subsidiary company or
for three years after either party to the licensing contract disposed
of its stocks in the joint venture company. Also A was prohibited
from handling competing products forever after withdrawal from
the joint venture as long as B remained a stockholder in the joint
venture. The FTC advised the parties to modify the contract to
read "as long as B is the owner of the stock of the joint venture
company, or until two years have elapsed after A disposed of all
the stock of the joint venture company, whichever is shorter."
A third case involved a contract between two Japanese companies, A and B, and a Swedish company C. According to their licensing agreement, C licensed technology to A and A sublicensed
it to B; A would then sell the products in Japan manufactured by B.
In the original draft of the contract, B was bound not to manufacture any constituent part of the products or purchase same from any
one other than C unless the production cost or purchase price was
lower than or equal to the constituent part that C was to supply.
Pursuant to the advice of the FTC, this restrictive clause was stricken
out of the licensing agreement.
A fourth case involved a contract between two Japanese companies, A and B, a British company C, a' German company D, and a
Swiss company E for the establishment of a "patent pool." This
contract was aimed at exchanging present and future technology
with regard to certain machines between A and B on one hand, and
C, D and E on the other. There were, however, the following restrictions involved in this agreement: (1) the two Japanese companies would not sell the machines in England, West Germany or
Switzerland and the three European companies would not sell the
machines in Japan (a mutual restriction of the sales territories), and
(2) whenever one of the parties wished to grant a license of the
patent involved in this patent pool to a third party, it must first obtain the consent of all the parties to the licensing agreement. The
FTC held that this agreement unduly restrained competition in the
marketing of this machine since these five companies were quite
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powerful in this field and therefore the restrictions involved in this
licensing agreement could not be considered to be a valid exercise
of patent rights. At the last report, a fiegotiation was proceeding
between these parties and the FTC for the elimination of both restrictions.
A fifth case involved a contract between companies A and C for
import of technology. It was concluded following establishment in
Japan by company B of its wholly-owned subsidiary, company C.
Company C desired to acquire from company A, a major British cosmetic manufacturer, know-how relating to the manufacture of cosmetics and an exclusive trademark license. The following problems
were found with respect to said contract: (1) Article 5 of the licensing agreement provided: "Licensee (C) shall be responsible for
sale in accordance with Licensor's (A) marketing policy." This
provision placed C in subordination to A in terms of business policy.
The term "marketing policy" has extensive implications which can
be interpreted to include factors other than basic sales policy, such
as price, quantity, sales method, etc. of individual goods, and accordingly, the term could be interpreted as restricting sales methods,
quantity, price, etc. The FTC suspected this provision of falling
under Item No. 10 of the FTC's General Designation of Unfair
Business Practices (discussed above) on the ground of A's abuse of
its technological superiority. Consequently the parties concerned
were advised either to delete said provision or to revise the same to
read: "A shall provide appropriate advice on sales method, etc.
when it deems it necessary." (2) Article 8 of the licensing agreement read: "The retail price shall not be lower than that of a similar product in the United States." This provision obviously was designed to restrict the resale price, and it was suspected of falling
under Item I, Paragraph 6 of the FTC's Guidelines. Also specific
figures restricting resale price were given, including the words "shall
not be sold for a price lower than ...... In this case even if specific
figures had not been given, the words "shall not be lower than"
would have constituted an unfair restriction. Accordingly, the FTC
advised the parties to delete said provision. (3) Article 11 of the
licensing agreement provided: "Licensee and B shall not handle
any product which is competitive with the Product in terms of price
and quality without the written consent of Licensor." Issues arising
from such a restrictive provision must be separated into those with
respect to C, Licensee, and those with respect to B, C's parent company, because of the different status of B and C. It was established
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that because C was granted an exclusive license to manufacture and
sell the cosmetics concerned within Japan (including Okinawa) and
thus need not fear intrusion of the market by other competitors, C
was obligated to use its efforts solely for the sale of said cosmetics.
Consequently, when an exclusive license is thus granted, the FTC
considers some restriction of the handling of competitive goods as
inevitable even under the Antimonopoly Law. Item I, Paragraph 3
of the FTC's Guidelines prohibits the imposition of restrictions on
the handling of competitive products or the use of competitive technology except in the case of a grant of an exclusive license which
imposes no restriction on the products or technology handled or
exercised by a licensee prior to the granting of the exclusive license.
This means that restrictions may be imposed on the handling of
competitive products only when the license granted is exclusive and
there is no infringement on a licensee's vested rights. No restrictions may be imposed in any other cases. The FTC saw no ground
under the Antimonopoly Law for the imposition of restrictions by
A on B in connection with the handling of competitive products.
A might have imposed such restrictions on both B and C on the
basis of the interpretation that B and C are one entity because of
their relationship as a parent company and a wholly-owned subsidiary with the same representative director serving both companies
simultaneously. On the basis of the assumption, however, that the
imposition of the foregoing restrictions on C is allowed only under
certain terms and conditions, imposition of such restrictions on B
raises problems. Consequently, it was advised that the provision
imposing restrictions on B be deleted. (4) The restrictive provision
further went on to limit the scope of competitive products to those
"which are competitive with the Product in terms of price and quality." However, the manufacture of products of highly extensive
quality levels in the instant case was considered possible without a
significant change of manufacturing facilities or methods. Therefore, the FTC apparently did not think it important to take up the
case in which the scope of competitive products was limited.
B.

Acquisition and Control of Japanese Business Enterprises

Generally speaking, in the acquisition and control of Japanese
business enterprises the following antimonopoly restrictions are
most relevant: (1) prohibition of holding company; (2) restriction of stockholding by a company; (3) restriction of stockholding
by a financial company; (4) restriction on interlocking directorates;
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(5) restriction of stockholding by a person other than a company;
(6) restriction on merger; and (7) restriction of transfer of business.
(1) Holding Company-A pure holding company is prohibited
under Article 9 of the Antimonopoly Law regardless of the size and
the effect of a proposed holding company. A pure holding company (mochikabu kaisha) is defined in Article 9(3) of the Law as
% company whose principal business is to control the business activities of a company or companies in Japan by means of stockholding (including partnership share)." Therefore, an "operating holding company" is not prohibited. If a company which is primarily
engaged in the production and sale of some commodity or in some
other business also holds stocks of various other companies, it is not
regarded as a holding company under the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law.
A foreign holding company which holds stocks of Japanese companies probably is outside the ban of Article 9 as long as it does not
transact business in Japan. 9 Furthermore, it is likely that Article 9
would not apply to a situation where a foreign holding corporation
acquires shares in a Japanese company in connection with the business activities of its subsidiary - for example, a situation where a
holding corporation acquires shares in a Japanese joint venture with
which a subsidiary of the holding corporation enters into a technological assistance agreement. However, the prohibition would
apply to a situation where such foreign holding corporation acquires
shares in a Japanese company merely to control the company without any substantial connection with business activities of the holding
corporation or its subsidiaries.
There is considerable doubt as to whether a domestic holding
company which holds stocks of foreign companies operating in foreign countries falls within the prohibition of Article 9. It may be
that such a holding company is also prohibited as long as it is a
pure holding company established in Japan. On the other hand, it
can be argued that such a holding company has no adverse effect
upon the Japanese economy and therefore it should be considered
to be outside the scope of the domestic Antimonopoly Law.
(2) Stockholding-Under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law,
acquisition and holding of stocks of a company by another company
39 Note, however, that Article 9 (2) of the Antimonopoly Law states: "Any company
(including a foreign company; hereinafter the same) shall neither become nor operate
as a holding company in Japan."
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is prohibited whenever such acquisition or holding may substantially
restrain competition in some area of business. The relevant provision is Article 10(1) of the Law which provides: "No company
shall acquire or own stock of a company or companies in Japan in
the event that the effect of such acquisition or owning of stock may
be substantially to restrain competition in any particular field of
trade, or that such acquisition or owning of stock is made through
unfair business practices." To fall within the prohibition of this
Article, it is not necessary that a company acquire or own the stock
of a competitor. On the contrary, if a company engaged in manufacturing acquires or owns stocks of a company engaged in retailing,
it may come under the prohibition of Article 10 if such acquisition
or owning may substantially restrain competition in any particular
field of trade. The key problem here is to determine the meaning
of "may substantially restrain competition in any particular field of
trade."
In FTC v. Nihon Gakki Kabushiki Kaisha,40 a case in point,
Nihon Gakki, a powerful manufacturer of music instruments, held
shares in companies whose output totaled 54o of the market's production of pianos, 64o of the organ market, and 27o of the harmonica market. This company acquired 24.5%o of the outstanding
shares of Kawai Gakki Kabushiki Kaisha, a competing company
holding shares totaling 16% in the production of pianos, 13%lo in
organs, and 7o in harmonicas. This acquisition was made in the
name of a third party which was controlled by Nihon Gakki. By
holding 24.5% of the outstanding shares of Kawai Gakki, Nihon
Gakki was able to control Kawai Gakki, its competitor. Therefore,
through this acquisition and the holding of stocks, competition
would be lessened as much as 70o in the production of pianos,
77o in organs and 35o in harmonicas. This acquisition was held
illegal by the FTC since it amounted to a violation of Article 17
which prohibits, inter alia, the evasion of the prohibitions set forth
in Article 10 of the Antimonopoly Law.
In the recent case of FTC v. Toyo Can Kabushiki Kaisha,4 ' the
FTC investigated the establishments of seven can manufacturing
companies in Japan alleging that Toyo Can Kabushiki Kaisha, the
leading manufacturer of cans in Japan, had suppressed competition
40 8 KOSEI
(1957).

TORIHIKI

IINKAI SHINKETSU

SHU

(FTC Devisions Reporter)

51

41 Reported in Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economic Newspaper), Jan. 12, 1972,
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by acquiring stocks in competing companies and by establishing interlocking directorates in violation of Article 3 (private monopolization and unreasonable restraint of trade) and Article 10 of the
Antimonopoly Law. The trial has not yet begun and it is too premature to predict what the outcome may be. However, one can
reasonably say that this aspect of the Antimonopoly Law is becoming vitalized.
When a company in Japan, engaged in nonfinancial business,
has total assets exceeding 500 million yen (roughly U.S. $1.7 million), or a foreign company engaged in nonfinancial business owns
stock in another company or companies in Japan, it must submit a
report to the FTC on such stock holding whether it is held in its
name or in the name of a trustee at the end of every business year
within two months therefrom, pursuant to Article 10(2) of the Law.
It has been reported that the FTC plans to tighten up the reporting duties vis-a-vis foreign enterprises operating in Japan.42 The
reason given by the FTC is as follows. As the liberalization of foreign investment progresses, it can be anticipated that more and more
foreign enterprises will enter the Japanese market. To keep a
"proper surveillance" on these matters, it is necessary for the FTC
to obtain appropriate information as to the relationship between
these foreign enterprises and their Japanese subsidiaries.43 Under
certain circumstances, the FTC may even order foreign enterprises
to submit reports on their corporate relationships in foreign coun44
tries.
(3) Stockholding by Financial Companies-Restrictions are
imposed on stockholding by a financial company under Article
11 (1) of the Law which states: "No company engaged in financial
business shall acquire or own stock of another company or companies in Japan in the event that it may be to own stock of the said
company or companies exceeding ten percent (10%) of the total
outstanding stock thereof." The test of illegality here is clear, since
it is expressly provided that more than 10%o of the stock cannot be
acquired without prior approval of the FTC. However, under
Article 11(1), it is provided that a financial company can acquire
more than 10% of the outstanding stock of a company if (1) said
42 See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economic Newspaper), Mar. 18, 1972,

at 3.
431d.

4 This may well pose some interesting jurisdictional problems. Cf. Emmerglich,
Antitrust Jurisdiction and the Production of Documents Located Abroad, 11 RECORD
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 122 (1956).
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acquisition or owning of stock is the result of the enforcement of a
lien, pledge, mortgage, or of payment in kind, (2) said acquisition
or owning of stock is made by a company engaged in the transaction
of securities in the course of its business, or (3) said acquisition of
stock is made for a securities trust or the holding in a securities trust
wherein the trustor is the beneficiary and retains the voting rights.
Nevertheless, if a financial company has come to own stock in
another company and wishes to continue owning such stocks after
one year, it must obtain prior approval of the FTC.
(4) Interlocking Directorates-Domination or control of enterprises may be accomplished through the utilization of interlocking directorates.45 Such an interlocking directorate is prohibited under Article 13 of the Law if it may "substantially restrain competition in any particular field of trade" or if it may "coerce another
company through unfair business practices." This means that an
officer or employee of a company cannot simultaneously hold the
position of an officer in another company when the effect is to substantially restrain competition in any particular field of trade. In
case an officer or employee of a company currently holds the position of an officer in another company in Japan, a report must be
filed with the FTC whenever the total assets of either company exceeds 500 million yen pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Law.
(5) Stockholding by a Person Other Than a Company-As to
stockholding by a person other than a company, under Article 14 of
the Law the same restrictions are provided as in the case of stockholding by a company (discussed above).
(6) Merger-With regard to merger,46 the following restriction is provided in Article 15(1) of the Law: "No company in
Japan shall effect a merger . .. (1) In case a substantial restraint of
competition in any particular field of trade may be caused by the
merger; (2) In case unfair business practices have been employed
in the course of the merger." Article 15(2) provides that every
company desirous of becoming a party to a merger must file a prior
report with the FTC. The parties involved cannot effect a merger
until thirty days have elapsed after such filing, during which period
the FTC must initiate an action against such proposed merger if it
45 In the United States interlocking directorates are also prohibited, but section 8 of
the Clayton Act basically limits such prohibition to the officers, directors, and directors
of financial institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
46 For an English language discussion of merger regulation in Japan, see Ariga,
Merger Regulation in Japan, 5 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 112 (1969).
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considers that the merger would be illegal. This waiting period
can be extended thirty more days by the FTC with the consent of
the parties (Article 15(3)).
Even though small and medium size Japanese enterprises are
turning to mergers, the major trend in the merger and consolidation
area has been "among the larger companies that have made up the
prewar Zaibatsu system."47 This trend lends particular significance
to the merger provisions of the Antimonopoly Law.
There have been four major instances reported in this area. Three
of these cases involved the merger of the Snow Brand Dairy Company
and Clover Dairy Company (share of total market: butter 57.7%0 and
cheese 75o in 1958), that of Chuo Textile Company and Teikoku
Linen Company (share of total linen thread market: 56.8%0 in
1959), and that of three Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Companies
(share of total market: shipbuilding 27.6o, steam power generat-

ing turbines 24%/o, trucks 25o, buses 25o; capital stock 76 billion
yen in 1963). Antimonopoly issues were informally raised in each
of these cases, but the mergers were subsequently approved in each
case. All three of these cases were resolved pursuant to the administrative guidance of the FTC and therefore no formal adjudications
or FTC decisions resulted therefrom. In the merger of Yahata Steel
Company and Fuji Steel Company, by which Japan Steel Company
(Shinnihon Seitetsu Kabushiki Kaisha) was established, some additional problems occurred. This newly merged Japan Steel Corporation was to occupy 100o of the market in the production of rails
for railroads, 61.27o in tin-plates, 56.3o in steel ingots, and 98.3o
in sheet pile. This merger was finally approved by the FTC on the
condition that the Japan Steel Corporation would help its competitors in certain ways (to be 48directed by the FTC) so that they might
effectively compete with it.
In 1968 three big paper manufacturing companies - Ohji Seishi
Ltd., Jujo Seishi Ltd. and Honshu Seishi Ltd., which together constituted Ohji Seishi Ltd. prior to the dissolution immediately after
the War - were desirous of merging into one company. However,
on September 20, 1968, anticipating that the FTC would not approve of it, these companies decided to call off the merger plan.
This was not the result of formal action taken by the FTC; how47 See Chase Manhattan Bank, supra note 10, at 32.

16 KOSEi TORIHIKI IINKAI SHU (FTC
48FTC v. Yanata Seitesu Kabushiki et al.,
Decisions Reporter) 46 (1969).
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ever, the case is noteworthy in that the merger plan was cancelled
because of Antimonopoly Law considerations.
(7)
Transfer of Business-Transfer of business is prohibited
under the Antimonopoly Law if its effect may be to substantially
restrain competition in any particular field of trade. Pursuant to
Article 16 of the Law, activities such as acquiring the whole or a
substantial part of the business or the fixed business assets, taking a
lease or undertaking the management of a whole or a substantial
part of the business in Japan of another company, or entering into
a contract which provides for a joint profit and loss account for
business in Japan with another company are subject to FTC regulation.
C.

Distribution Agreements.

Recently the distribution and retail aspects of the Japanese economy have attracted much attention of both the FTC and the public
at large from the following two standpoints. (1) Consumer prices
have kept rising in the past decade in spite of the various efforts on
the part of the government agencies to combat inflation. In this
regard, the restraints on competition at the distribution and retail
level which may hinder retail prices from dropping may be a partial
cause for such inflation. (2) Despite the recent revaluation of yen,
the prices of some imported products in the domestic market have
remained at as high a level as they were before the revaluation. It
may well be that some sole distributors of certain imported products
have monopoly positions and manipulate the domestic prices. Both
the FTC and the Economic Planning Agency of the Japanese Government have embarked on an investigation of these problems.
Often, when a foreign company wishes to establish sales channels in Japan, some kind of distributorship agreement will be involved. In this section an attempt will be made to delineate some
of the antimonopoly problems which can arise in this area. Assume
an American company A, a British company B, and a Japanese company C (the manufacturers of commodity X) establish a Japanese
joint venture D to distribute commodity X throughout Japan. In
this case, D is a jointly owned subsidiary-distributor of A, B and C
in Japan. The relationship between the parents, A, B and C, on the
one hand and the subsidiary, D, on the other may take various
forms depending on the contents of the related contracts. It may
be that the parents will contract to sell commodity X to D and that
a trademark will be licensed to D. Whatever the relationship be-
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tween the parents and the subsidiary may be, various types of restrictions will most likely be imposed on the activities of the subsidiary. In the above example, an attempt may be made by A, B
and C to prohibit D from handling any commodity in competition
with commodity X. Or A, B and C may attempt to dictate to D the
resale price of commodity X in Japan. Or some other kinds of restrictions may be imposed on D, such as a restriction of sales territory, kinds of customers, and so forth. Each of these restrictions
may raise antimonopoly problems.
Roughly classified, there appear to be the following four kinds
of problems in relation to the usual restrictions attempted to be
imposed on Japanese distributors: (1) exclusive dealing arrangements; (2) various kinds of tie-in clauses; (3) restrictions on sales
territories and kinds of customers; and (4) resale price maintenance.
These restrictions may sometimes fall within the categorization of
Items Nos. 7 and 8, as set forth in the FTC's General Designation
49
of Unfair Business Practices.
(1) Exclusive Dealing Arrangements-Exclusive dealing arrangements are those in which one party to a contract deals with the
other party on the condition that the latter does not deal with the
former's competitors. In the above example, if A, B and C impose
a restriction on D to the effect that D should not deal with the competitors of A, B and C, then the arrangement between A, B and C
on the one hand and D on the other may be said to be an exclusive
arrangement. Under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, these practices are not illegal per se. However, under some circumstances,
they may fall within the prohibition of Item No. 7 of the FTC's
General Designation of Unfair Business Practices which prohibits
"dealing with customers on the condition that they shall, without
good cause, not supply commodities, funds or other kinds of economic benefit from a competitor of oneself." Note, that to hold
an exclusive dealing arrangement illegal under this designation, the
arrangement should be "without good cause."
According to existing precedents, it is usually only when the
parties imposing exclusive dealing conditions are so powerful that
they can effectively deprive competitors of channels of distribution
that such exclusive dealing arrangements are held to be illegal under
the Law. In the case of FTC v. Taisho Seiyaku Kahushiki Kaisha, °
49

See note 16 supra & accompanying text.
KoSEi TORIHIKI IINAKI SHINKTESU SHU
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the restriction imposed by Taisho, a powerful manufacturer of
pharmaceutical products, on over three thousand retail drugstores to
the effect that they should not handle competing products as long
as they wished to distribute Taisho's products, was held illegal. On
the other hand, in FTC v. Nihon Kogaku Kabushiki Kaisha,5' the
exclusive dealing restriction imposed by a manufacturer of cameras
and binoculars upon a distributor in the export market coupled with
an exclusive sales territory was held lawful. In Kabushiki Kaisha
Hokkaido Shinbun Sha v. FTC,52 Hokkaido Shinbun Sha, the most
powerful newspaper company in Hokkaido, forced the sellers of
newspapers to stop selling newspapers of a competitor, Hokkai
Times, in order to drive this company out of the market. The Supreme Court decided that this practice by Hokkaido Shinbun Sha
was illegal under the Antimonopoly Law. The case of FTC v.
Amano Seiyaku Kabushiki Kaisha, discussed previouslyR is also a
case involving a distributorship agreement in which the restrictions
imposed on the distributors contained such items as resale price
maintenance, exclusive dealing and others.
Even though the test for judging illegality under Item No. 7 of
the FTC's General Designation is not entirely clear at this time, one
can probably state, based on a review of the previous cases, that:
(1) when the party imposing an exclusive dealing restriction demands the other party upon whom such conditions are imposed to
stop dealing with its competitors, despite the fact that they have
been dealing with them in the past, the danger of such conditions
being held illegal under the Antimonopoly Law becomes very great;
and (2) when the restrictions extend beyond the life of the main
contract they may be regarded as illegal per se.
(2) Tie-in clause-Tie-in clause refers to restrictions whereby
the purchase of commodities or services is conditioned on the purchase of some other commodity or service. For example, if A, B
and C supply commodity X to D on the condition that D purchases
another commodity Y from Company E, another subsidiary of A, B
and C, then this supply contract between A, B and C on the one
hand and D on the other is a tie-in contract. Tie-in clauses fall generally within the regulation of Item No. 8 of the FTC's General
514 KosEI TORIHIKI IINKAI SHINKETSU

SHU

(FTC

Decisions

Reporter)

30

(1952).
52 5 KOSEI TORIHIKI IINKAI SHINKETSU SHU (FTC Decisions Reporter) 5 (1953),

afl'd, 15 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREI SHU (Supreme Court Civil Cases Reporter)
116 (1961). Cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
53 See discussion accompanying note 25 supra.
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Designation which prohibits "dealing with -customers on conditions
which, without good reason, restrict any transaction between the
said customers and the supplier of commodities, funds, or other
kinds of economic benefit to them or between the said customers
and any person receiving those from them, or any relationship between the said customers and their competitors."
Tie-in clauses are regarded generally to be an unreasonable expansion of the monopoly power enjoyed by the party or parties imposing such restriction with respect to the tying commodity to the
tied commodity of which they had originally no control. For this
reason, such clauses are considered to be illegal, except for special
cases in which they are deemed necessary to maintain the efficiency
of the technology licensed or the goodwill of the trademark licensed. If, for instance, A, B and C manufacture ice-cream mix and
license the trademark "ABC" to D and impose upon D the restriction that he should purchase some products to go with ice-cream
(for example, chocolate, strawberries, etc.) from A, B and C, such
restriction is likely to be held lawful if it is deemed necessary to impose such restriction in order to maintain the reputation of the
trademark "ABC." This situation may occur when there is no other
manufacturer capable of manufacturing chocolate or strawberries of
the high quality necessary for preserving the reputation of the trademark. Or it may be due to the efficient manufacturing of certain
kinds of materials which are not available except from the designated source. In such exceptional situations, a tie-in clause may be
54
exonerated from the ban.
(3) Territorial and Customer Restrictions-Concerning territorial and customer restrictions, the rules of law are not clear at this
time in Japan since neither the FTC nor the courts have handed
down a decision directly relating to these matters. However, problems are likely to arise in these areas in the near future due to the
fact that the so-called franchise system of distribution is becoming
very popular in Japan and such restrictions are usually involved in
franchise agreements.
Most likely these kinds of restrictions will not be regarded as
per se violations of the Antimonopoly Law. Under some circum14 It is not always possible to effectively impose restrictions against tie-in clauses
since the same purpose can often be accomplished between the parties by contracting
for stringent product specifications. See, e.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd, 332 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U. S. 125 (1965). Cf. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131 (1936).
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stances, however, they may fall within the prohibition of Item No.
8 of the FTC's General Designation. It is likely that the restriction
of territorial areas and customers imposed upon a distributor will
be considered illegal when the party imposing such restriction is
very powerful or when such restriction is coupled with the prohibition of handling competing products.
(4) Resale Price Maintenance and Some Other ProblemsPursuant to Article 24-2 of the Antimonopoly Law, resale price
maintenance provisions are exempted from its ban under certain
circumstances. To qualify for the exemption the commodity must
be so designated by the FTC and the uniform quality of such commodity must be easily identifiable. This means in effect that the
commodity must be a trademarked good. In spite of the above, exemption is not granted if the resale price maintenance is deemed to
grossly injure the interest of consumers in general. Furthermore,
such resale price maintenance cannot be practiced against the will of
the manufacturer.
The FTC may designate a commodity as exempted if it is for
the daily use by consumers in general, and if free competition exists
with respect to the commodity, that is, there are some competing
brands. At present, cosmetics, drugs, and some other products are
designated as exempted commodities. If the commodity of which
the resale price is maintained does not fulfill the requirements provided in Article 24-2 of the Law, then such restriction will probably be held illegal since the direction of the resale price of the
commodity already sold is tantamount to the restriction imposed
upon the distributor's pricing activity - a type of restriction prohibited under Item No. 8 of the FTC's General Designation.
Resale price maintenance is sometimes enforced by means of refusing to supply the commodity or by threatening to reduce or cut
rebates given to the distributors. If, for example, a distributor were
to undersell a commodity of which the resale price has been set by
the manufacturer, the manufacturer may withdraw supply from the
distributor in an effort to penalize the distributor, or the manufacturer may reduce or cut the rebate to be given to the distributor.
These practices are illegal as long as the main transaction, that is,
the resale price maintenance, is not exempted from the FTC prohibition. In many cases, the manufacturers set the wholesale price
and retail price and thereby decide the margins of profit to be made
by the wholesalers and the retailers. Often these margins are set
very small and the profit of the wholesalers and retailers must be
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derived from the rebate which is given by the manufacturers. However, practically speaking, the payment of such rebate and its amount
may be conditioned upon whether or not the distributors observe
the resale price. This type of rebating practice is unlawful because
it is an enforcement measure for maintaining the resale price of the
commodity not exempted from the regulation. 5
Concerning restrictive provisions found in distributorship agreements it may be generally stated that in determining the vulnerability under the Antimonopoly Law the FTC appears to give substantial weight to considerations of "fairness" of the agreement in question as well as to more conventional antitrust considerations of economic injury to the consuming public. "Fairness" is of course an
elusive concept, but one criterion heavily relied upon by the FTC in
assessing fairness is whether or not, in situations in which it would
be feasible to do so, the various engagements of the parties have
been symmetrically drawn so as to create substantially analogous
rights and obligations in the parties. For example, the FTC generally takes the position that an undertaking by a supplier not to
supply to other distributors in a particular territory must be accompanied by an undertaking by the distributor not to deal in the territory in products competitive with those which are the subject of the
distributorship agreement in question.
III.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to set forth a general introduction to
the Antimonopoly Law of Japan with special emphasis placed on
those provisions of the Law which are relevant to international business transactions, including the licensing of patents and technology,
the acquisition and control of Japanese business enterprises, and the
utilization of distributorship agreements.
The Amano case established the precedent that it is possible to
implement the Antimonopoly Law as a partial countermeasure
against liberalization of trade and investment in Japan. The FTC
appears to be taking the view that in an effort to preserve orderly
competition in the Japanese market and to place some controls on
the present internationalization era the Antimonopoly Law will be
utilized for controlling the foreign induction of technology and
65 See FTC v. Meiji Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 15 KoSEI TORIHIKI IINKAI SHINKETSU
SHu (FTC Decisions Reporter) 67 (1968); FTC v. Morinaga Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha,
15 KoSES TORIHIKI IINKAI SHINKETSU SHU 84 (1968); FTC V. Wakodo Kabushiki
Kaisha, 15 KosEi TORIHIKI IINKAI SHINKETSU SHU 94 (1968).
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capital tie-ups under terms and conditions which might be unreasonable and unfair to Japanese companies.
Antimonopoly Law concepts of impermissible restraints on competition and prohibitions against unfair business practices are highly
elastic in Japan, as elsewhere. However, there are indications that
these concepts may in general receive more expansive construction
and broader application in Japan over the next several years, especially where international agreements or foreign-invested enterprises
are concerned.
APPENDIX A
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS
(Translated by the Staff Office of the Fair Trade Commission)
May 24, 1968
Fair Trade Commission of Japan
I. Among the restrictions which are liable to come under unfair
business practices in international licensing agreements on patent
rights or utility model rights (hereinafter referred to as patent
rights, etc.) the following are the outstanding:
(1) To restrict the area to which the licensee may export the
goods covered by patent rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as patented goods).
However, cases coming under a, b, or c listed below are excluded.
a. In case the licensor has patent rights, etc. which have been
registered in the area to which the licensee's export is restricted (hereinafter referred to as the restricted area);
b. In case the licensor is selling patented goods in the restricted
area in his normal business;
c. In case the licensor has granted to a third party an exclusive
license to sell in the restricted area.
(2) To restrict the licensee's export prices or quantities of patented goods, or to make it obligatory for the licensee to export
patented goods through the licensor or a person designated by the
licensor.
However, such cases are excluded where the licensor grants license to export to the area coming under either of the preceding
a, b, or c and the said restrictions or obligations imposed are of reasonable scope.
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(3) To restrict the licensee from manufacturing, using or selling goods, or employing technology which are in competition with
the licensed subject.
However, such cases are excluded where the licensor grants an
exclusive license and imposes no restriction on goods already being
manufactured, used or sold, or technology already being utilized by
the licensee.
(4) To make it obligatory for the licensee to purchase raw
materials, parts, etc. from the licensor or a person designated by
the licensor.
(5) To make it obligatory for the licensee to sell patented
goods through the licensor or a person designated by the licensor.
(6) To restrict the resale prices of patented goods in Japan.
(7) To make it obligatory for the licensee to inform the licensor of knowledge or experience newly obtained regarding the
licensed technology, or to assigning the right with respect to an
improved or applied invention by the licensee to the licensor or to
grant the licensor a license thereon.
However, such cases are excluded where the licensor bears similar obligations and the obligations of both parties are equally
balanced in substance.
(8) To charge royalties on goods which do not utilize licensed
technology.
(9) To restrict the quality of raw materials, parts, etc. or of
patented goods.
However, such cases are excluded where such restrictions are
necessary to maintain the creditability of the registered trademark
or to insure the effectiveness of the licensed technology.
II. The aforementioned guidelines shall apply to international
know-how licensing agreements.
III. In international licensing agreements on patent rights, etc., the
following acts shall be regarded as the exercise of rights under the
Patent Law or the Utility Model Law:
(1) To grant license to manufacture, use, sell, etc. separately;
(2) To grant license for a limited period within the life of
patent rights, etc. or for a limited area within the whole area
covered by patent rights, etc.;
(3) To restrict the manufacture of patented goods to a limited
field of technology or to restrict the sale thereof to a limited field
of sales;
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(4) To restrict the use of patented processes to a limited field
of technology;
(5) To restrict the amount of output or the amount of sales
of patented goods or to restrict the frequency of the use of patented
processes.
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